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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Denise Frances Nesbitt appeals from the restitution order entered upon 
the judgment entered pursuant to her guilty plea to grand theft.  On appeal, 
Nesbitt argues the district court erred when it ordered her to pay restitution for all 
of the victim’s stolen jewelry and abused its discretion when it based the market 
value of the jewelry, in part, on the victim’s testimony regarding the purchase 
price of the jewelry.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
 Gloria Buck hired Nesbitt to help her take care of her disabled daughter.  
(R., p. 8.)  After Ms. Buck hired Nesbitt, some of Ms. Buck’s jewelry began to go 
missing from her bedroom.  (Id.)  Nesbitt was the only person who would have 
been in Ms. Buck’s bedroom unaccompanied.  (Id.)  Ms. Buck contacted the 
police and reported several items of jewelry were stolen, including: a gold 
bracelet, a gold necklace, ladies earrings, a brass Kokopelli, a ladies Pulsar 
wristwatch, a silver and coral ring, a Gucci pinkie ring, a man’s gold ring, a 1956 
high school class ring, and a man’s ring with a red star Ruby Cabachon. 
(R., pp. 9-10.)   
The police discovered that Nesbitt pawned several pieces of jewelry that 
matched Ms. Buck’s missing jewelry.  (R., pp. 8, 10.)  The pawn database 
showed three transactions in which Nesbitt sold jewelry to the pawnshop. 
(R., p. 10.)  Nesbitt claimed that Ms. Buck’s daughter told her to pawn all the 
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jewelry.  (R., p. 11.)  Ms. Buck’s daughter adamantly denied telling Nesbitt to 
pawn the jewelry.  (Id.)   
The state charged Nesbitt with grand theft, alleging that, between January 
1, 2014 and July 31, 2014, Nesbitt wrongfully stole “jewelry, of a value in excess 
of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) from the owner, Gloria Buck[.]”  (R., pp. 37-
38.)  Nesbitt entered an Alford1 guilty plea to the grand theft charge and agreed 
to pay restitution.  (9/16/15 Tr., p. 14, L. 25 – p. 15, L. 10; R., pp. 39-41.)  The 
state agreed not to file additional charges based on the police report.  (R., p. 41.)   
The state filed a Memorandum of Restitution and Nesbitt objected. 
(R., pp. 46-52.)  The state filed an Amended Memorandum of Restitution 
requesting $8,818 in restitution to Ms. Buck and $2,597 to American Family 
Insurance, Ms. Buck’s insurance company.  (R., pp. 53-58.)   
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Nesbitt to five years 
with two years fixed.  (R., pp. 75-78.)  The district court suspended the sentence 
and placed Nesbitt on probation.  (Id.)  The district court reserved jurisdiction to 
determine restitution following a restitution hearing.  (Id.)   
At the restitution hearing Ms. Buck testified regarding her missing jewelry 
and Nesbitt asked the district court to consider portions of the PSI.  (R., pp. 83-
91.)  Based upon the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, the district 
court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Restitution. 
(R., pp. 92-101.)  The district court considered factors in Idaho Code § 19-5304 
and found the “total economic loss suffered by the victim to be $7,747.80.” 
                                            
1 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).  
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(R., p. 96.)  Nesbitt timely appealed from the entry of the restitution order. 
(R., pp. 102-106.)   
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ISSUES 
 
Nesbitt states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. Did the district court err in awarding restitution for items 
which were not within the scope of the offense for which 
Ms. Nesbitt was convicted and for which she did not agree to 
pay restitution? 
 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in determining the 
amount of restitution? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issues as: 
 
 1. Has Nesbitt failed to show the plea agreement limited the scope of 
restitution and thus failed to show the district court erred when it awarded 
restitution to the victim based upon Nesbitt’s guilty plea to grand theft? 
 
 2. Has Nesbitt failed to show the district court abused its discretion 
when it determined the market value of the jewelry based primarily upon the 
victim’s testimony regarding the purchase price of the jewelry?    
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. 
The District Court Did Not Err When It Awarded Restitution To The Victim Of 
Nesbitt’s Crime Based Upon Nesbitt’s Guilty Plea To Grand Theft 
 
A. Introduction 
 Nesbitt argues that she only agreed to pay restitution for the jewelry she 
admitted to pawning.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 7-10.)  Nesbitt’s argument is not 
supported by the record.  Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing jewelry with a value in 
excess of $1,000 from Ms. Buck and she agreed to pay restitution. 
(See R., pp. 37-41.)  There is nothing in the plea agreement or plea colloquy that 
limited restitution to only those items of jewelry that Nesbitt admitted to pawning.  
The district court did not err by awarding restitution based upon Nesbitt’s guilty 
plea to grand theft.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“Plea agreements are contractual in nature and generally are examined 
by courts in accordance with contract law standards.”  State v. Shafer, 144 Idaho 
370, 374, 161 P.3d 689, 693 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing State v. Jafek, 141 Idaho 71, 
73, 106 P.3d 397, 399 (2005); State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410–11, 64 P.3d 
335, 336–37 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Fuhriman, 137 Idaho 741, 744, 52 P.3d 
886, 889 (Ct. App. 2002)).  “In interpreting the provisions of a contract, a court 
must first determine whether those terms are ambiguous or unambiguous, for 
the application of an unambiguous term is a question of law while the 
interpretation of ambiguous language presents a question of fact as to the 
parties’ intent.”  Id. (citing Doe, 138 Idaho at 410–11, 64 P.3d at 336–37). 
  6 
“Because the question whether a plea agreement is ambiguous is an issue of 
law, it is reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Fuhriman, 137 Idaho at 744, 52 P.3d at 
889).  
 
C. Nesbitt Pled Guilty To Stealing Jewelry From Ms. Buck; Nothing In The 
Plea Agreement Limited Her Restitution Obligations To Only Those Items 
Nesbitt Admitted To Pawning 
 
Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing jewelry from Ms. Buck.  (R., pp. 37-41.)  
After a restitution hearing the district court ordered Nesbitt to pay restitution for 
the stolen jewelry.  (R., pp. 92-101.)  The district court did not err.  “One of the 
purposes of restitution is to obviate the need for victims to incur the cost and 
inconvenience of a separate civil action in order to gain compensation for their 
losses.”  State v. Schultz, 148 Idaho 884, 886, 231 P.3d 529, 531 (Ct. App. 
2008) (citing State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 167, 139 P.3d 767, 769 (Ct. App. 
2006); State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624, 97 P.3d 489, 491 (Ct. App. 
2004)).  “The restitution statute evidences a policy favoring full compensation to 
crime victims who suffer economic loss.” Id. (citing State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 
687, 692, 169 P.3d 275, 280 (Ct. App. 2007)).   A “victim” is defined as “a person 
or entity, who suffers economic loss or injury as the result of the defendant’s 
criminal conduct.”  I.C. § 19-5304(1)(e)(i).  There must be a causal connection 
between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the damages the 
victim suffers.  Shafer, 144 Idaho at 372, 161 P.3d at 691.  Except where the 
parties have consented, a defendant cannot be required to pay restitution for 
damages stemming from separate, uncharged and unproven crimes.  Id.  
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Nesbitt pled guilty to grand theft for wrongfully taking jewelry from Ms. 
Buck between the dates of January 1, 2014 and July 31, 2014.  (R., pp. 37-40.)  
The state filed a memorandum listing the jewelry that was stolen by Nesbitt. 
(R., pp. 53-58.)  At a restitution hearing, Ms. Buck testified regarding the jewelry 
that went missing when Nesbitt worked at her house and the money paid by 
insurance.  (See 11/13/15 Tr. p. 8, Ls. 13-25, p. 15, Ls. 5-15, p. 20, Ls. 6-17, 
p. 24, L. 9 – p. 26, L. 23, p. 29, L. 15 – p. 47, L. 19, p. 48, L. 7 – p. 49, L. 15; 
Exs. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9.) 
The district court considered the “factors enumerated in Idaho Code § 19-
5304, the record of Defendant’s criminal proceedings, [and] the evidence 
presented at the restitution hearing” and exercised its discretion to determine the 
“economic loss suffered by the victim as a consequence of the defendant’s 
actions[.]”  (R., p. 96.)  Using its discretion the district court found “the total 
economic loss suffered by the victim to be $7,747.80.”  (Id.)   
On appeal, Nesbitt argues that the district court erred because 
“Ms. Nesbitt understood she would be required to pay restitution for the items 
she pawned, for which she received approximately $700.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 
7.)  Nesbitt claims the restitution order should be limited to only those items she 
admitted to pawning.  (Id.)  Nesbitt argues the other items of stolen jewelry for 
which she was ordered to pay restitution, “were beyond the scope of the offense 
for which Ms. Nesbitt was convicted and she did not agree to pay restitution as 
part of her plea agreement.”  (Id.)   
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Nesbitt’s argument is not supported by the record.  Nesbitt agreed to pay 
restitution based on her guilty plea to grand theft, and nothing in the plea 
agreement or plea colloquy limited the scope of her restitution obligation to only 
those items she admitted to pawning.  Nesbitt pled guilty to the following charge:   
That the defendant, DENISE FRANCES FEHLING, AKA, DENISE 
FRANCES NESBITT, on or about January 1, 2014, to July 31, 
2014, in the in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho, did 
wrongfully take personal property, to-wit: jewelry, of a value in 
excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) from the owner, Gloria 
Buck, with the intent to deprive another of property and/or 
appropriate to herself certain property of another and/or 
appropriate to a third person certain property of another, all of 
which is contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such 
case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the 
People of the State of Idaho. 
 
(R., pp. 37-40.)  Nesbitt agreed to pay restitution and the state agreed not to file 
additional charges based on the police report.  (R., p. 41.)   
THE COURT:  All right.  And according to this, she would also be 
required to pay restitution, that the State would agree with the 
sentence recommendation of a withheld judgment and would file no 
additional charges from the report. 
 
 With what [defense counsel] indicated and what the Court 
read, is this your understanding of the agreement, Miss Nesbitt? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes, ma’am.  
 
(9/16/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 13-21.)   
 
THE COURT:  Do you understand if you plead guilty, you may be 
required to pay restitution to any victim of your crime? 
 
THE DEFENDANT:  Yes. 
 
(9/16/15 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 4-7.)   Defense counsel clarified the factual basis for the 
grand theft charge and described some of the items that were stolen.  (9/16/15 
Tr., p. 15, L. 18 – p. 16, L. 12.)   
  9 
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]:  Thank you.  
 
 Your Honor, between January to October of 2014, there’s 
allegations by an individual named Gloria Buck that while my client 
was a caregiver in her house that my client wrongfully removed 
jewelry from the house, including rings, necklace, and I believe a 
bracelet from the residence, allegations that she intended to 
deprive them permanently from Miss Buck, and that all happened 
in Idaho.  
 
(9/16/15 Tr., p. 16, Ls. 4-12.)  On appeal, Nesbitt cites to arguments made 
regarding the scope of restitution; however, those arguments were made well 
after Nesbitt pled guilty and agreed to pay restitution.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 9-10 (citing 10/29/15 Tr., p. 21, Ls. 13-17, p. 23, Ls. 16-20).)  Those post-
guilty plea arguments were not part of the plea agreement.   
Neither the plea agreement nor the plea colloquy limited restitution to only 
those items of jewelry Nesbitt admitted to pawning.2  (See R., p. 41; 9/16/15 Tr., 
p. 11, Ls. 13-21, p. 14, Ls. 4-7.)  Because Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing jewelry 
from Ms. Buck she was liable for the full value of the stolen property.  See State 
v. Davis, 156 Idaho 671, 675, 330 P.3d 417, 421 (Ct. App. 2014) (“Because the 
loss of the full value of a stolen item is the direct and intended consequence of a 
theft offense, the perpetrator’s restitution liability is ordinarily the full value of 
property that was stolen.”).   
The Court of Appeals’ decision in Schultz is instructive.  See Schultz, 148 
Idaho at 886-887, 231 P.3d at 531-532.  At trial, the state presented evidence 
                                            
2 Further undercutting Nesbitt’s argument is the fact that almost all of the jewelry 
for which Ms. Buck sought restitution was listed in the police report attached to 
the Affidavit In Support of Probable Cause on which the grand theft charge was 
based.  (R., pp. 6-14.)   
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that Schultz made unauthorized transactions using the victim’s ATM card; 
however, at the restitution hearing “the state sought, and was awarded, 
restitution for additional unauthorized individual transactions.”  Id. at 885, 231 
P.3d at 530.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the restitution order.  Id. at 886-887, 
231 P.3d at 531-532.  The Court of Appeals held that because Schultz was 
convicted of committing grand theft by exercising unauthorized control over a 
period of time, and no specific amount of money was alleged in the charging 
document, Schultz was liable for restitution for all unauthorized transactions 
during the time frame in question.  Id. 
As charged in the information, Schultz was convicted of committing 
grand theft by exercising unauthorized control and/or making 
unauthorized transfers of Shayne’s credit card accounts and/or 
bank accounts in an amount exceeding $1,000 between October 
2003, and May 2004. Schultz had access to all of the credit cards 
for which unauthorized transactions were made. All of these 
transactions, upon which the restitution award was based, were 
within the scope of the grand theft for which Schultz was charged 
and convicted. 
 
Id.   
The same analysis regarding the scope of Nesbitt’s restitution obligation is 
true here.  Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing in excess of $1,000 in jewelry between 
January 1, 2014 and July 31, 2014.  (R., pp. 37-40.)  Therefore, like Schultz, the 
scope of Nesbitt’s restitution obligations extended to all jewelry stolen during that 
time period – not just the jewelry that Nesbitt admitted to pawning.   
The Amended Memorandum of Restitution listed the “Jewelry stolen by 
Denise Nesbitt.”  (R., p. 57.)  Ms. Buck only listed the items she was “positively 
sure of.”  (Id. (“These are the items I am positively sure of.  There could be more 
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items that I am not yet aware they are missing.”))  In addition to the jewelry, 
Ms. Buck included on her list of stolen items a “Kindle e-book reader.”  (Id.)  At 
the restitution hearing, the state did not seek restitution for the “Kindle e-book 
reader.”  (See R., pp. 83-91, 96.)  The state limited its restitution request to the 
stolen jewelry, and the district court only awarded restitution for the jewelry. 
(R., p. 96.)  The district court’s restitution order did not exceed the scope of the 
charge.  The district court did not err when it awarded restitution for jewelry 
stolen from Ms. Buck, between January 1, 2014 and July 31, 2014 because 
Nesbitt pled guilty to stealing that jewelry, and because the plea agreement did 
not limit restitution to only those items Nesbitt admitted to pawning.   
 
II. 
Nesbitt Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It 
Determined The Amount Of Restitution  
 
A. Introduction 
 After a restitution hearing, the district court ordered Nesbitt to pay 
restitution.  (R., pp. 92-101.)  The district court exercised its discretion and 
entered the order based upon “the factors enumerated in Idaho Code § 19-5304, 
the record of Defendant’s criminal proceedings, [and] the evidence presented at 
the restitution hearing[.]”  (R., p. 96.)  On appeal, Nesbitt has failed to show the 
district court abused its discretion.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The decision whether to order restitution and in what amount is committed 
to the trial court’s discretion.  State v. Higley, 151 Idaho 76, 78, 253 P.3d 750, 
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752 (Ct. App. 2010).  A decision to award restitution will not be overturned 
absent an abuse of discretion.  State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387, 391, 271 P.3d 
1243, 1247 (Ct. App. 2012).  The trial court’s factual findings in relation to 
restitution will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.  State v. 
Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013); State v. Corbus, 
150 Idaho 599, 602, 249 P.3d 398, 401 (2011).   
In considering whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court 
“conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine” whether the trial court (1) “correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion”; (2) “acted within the boundaries of 
such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices before it”; and (3) “reached its decision by an exercise of 
reason.”  State v. Weaver, 158 Idaho 167, 170, 345 P.3d 226, 229 (Ct. App. 
2014) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989)).     
 
C. Nesbitt Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Discretion 
When It Awarded Restitution Based Upon Valuation Evidence Presented 
At The Restitution Hearing  
 
 Ms. Buck testified about the value of her stolen jewelry.  She testified that 
her late husband purchased the ruby cabochon ring for $1,500 and also 
purchased the one-of-a-kind gold feather pin for $1,500.  (11/13/15 Tr., p. 8, 
L. 1 – p. 11, L. 21; Ex. 1.)  He also purchased an Omega gold necklace for 
$1,500 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 12, L. 11 – p. 14, L. 8; Exs. 3, 6); a gold domed cuff 
bracelet for $852.80 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 20, L. 13 – p. 24, L. 6; Ex. 8); a Gucci ring 
for $500 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 24, L. 9 – p. 26, L. 23); and a ladies Pulsar watch for 
$750 (11/13/15, p. 26, L. 25 – p. 31, L. 15; Ex. 9).  Her husband’s father 
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purchased the men’s heavy gold ring for between $1,200 and $1,500.  (11/13/15 
Tr., p. 31, L. 16 – p. 41, L. 15.)  Ms. Buck testified she purchased the sterling 
silver bracelet for around $300 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 41, L. 17 – p. 42, L. 11); the 
1956 high school class ring for $100 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 42, L. 12 – p. 43, L. 4); the 
coral bracelet for $250 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 43, L. 5 – p. 44, L. 23); three pairs of 
costume jewelry earrings for approximately $175 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 44, L. 22 – 
p. 47, L. 1); and a brass Kokopelli pin for about $50 (11/13/15 Tr., p. 47, Ls. 2-
16).  Ms. Buck testified she submitted a claim to her homeowner’s insurance.  
(11/13/15 Tr., p. 48, L. 7 – p. 49, L. 15.)  Her policy had a limit of $5,000, with a 
deductible of $2,500 (Id.)  Her insurance company eventually issued her a check 
for $2,597.  (Id.)  Nesbitt asked the district court to consider portions of the PSI.  
(11/13/15 Tr., p. 70, L. 10 – p. 73, L. 3.)   
The district court determined, based upon the amount of insurance paid 
and the amount of the deductible, that $5,097.28 was a “reasonable starting 
point for restitution.”  (R., pp. 95-96.)  From this starting point, the district court 
considered and weighed the evidence presented and determined that Ms. Buck’s 
valuation of some items did not reflect the altered condition and current value 
and the “Court in, its discretion, has reduced the value of those items.” 
(R., pp. 96-97.)  The Court held: 
 This Court having considered the factors enumerated in 
Idaho Code § 19-5304, the record of Defendant’s criminal 
proceedings, the evidence presented at the restitution hearing, and 
in exercising the Court’s discretion determines the economic loss 
suffered by the victim as a consequence of Defendant’s actions as 
follows: 
 
1. Men’s heavy gold ring – $500.00.  
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2. Gold domed 12 mm cuff bracelet – $852.80. 
3. Gucci ring – $500.00. 
4. Ladies Pulsar wristwatch – $750.00. 
5. Sterling silver domed cuff bracelet – $300.00. 
6. 1956 High School class ring – $25.00. 
7. Coral bracelet – $250.00.  
8. Costume jewelry earrings – $50.00. 
9. Kokopelli coat pin – $20.00[.] 
10. Gold feather pin – $1,500.00[.] 
11. Omega gold necklace – $1,500.00. 
12. Ruby Cabochon ring – $1,500.00. 
 
(R., p. 96 (citing State’s Memorandum of Restitution).)  “The Court finds the total 
economic loss suffered by the victim to be $7,747.80.” (R., p. 96.)  The district 
court ordered that Nesbitt pay restitution in the amount of $5,150.52 to Ms. Buck 
and $2,597.28 to American Family Insurance, Ms. Buck’s insurance carrier. 
(R., p. 99.)   
Nesbitt argues the district court abused its discretion when it awarded 
restitution because, Nesbitt claims, the state failed to introduce “sufficient 
evidence regarding either the market value or replacement cost of the items of 
jewelry[.]”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 11.)  Specifically, she argues, “The district court 
abused its discretion in awarding restitution based solely on Ms. Buck’s 
testimony about the purchase price of her property.”  (Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)  
Nesbitt’s argument is without merit.  The district court recognized its 
determination of restitution was a discretionary decision and reached its 
conclusion by an exercise of reason and within the bounds of the law. 
(See R., pp. 92-101.)   
The district court properly used its discretion to determine the market 
value of the stolen property.  In Idaho, the owner of property is competent to 
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testify as to its market value without qualifying the owner as an expert witness.  
See State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 510, 960 P.2d 190, 193 (Ct. App. 
1998) (citing State v. Hughes, 130 Idaho 698, 704 n. 1, 946 P.2d 1338, 1344 n. 1 
(Ct. App. 1997)).  In the context of restitution, “value means the market value of 
the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satisfactorily 
ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reasonable time 
after the crime.”  I.C. § 18-2402(11)(a).   
The method by which the district court determines a restitution amount is 
left to the discretion of the district court.  See State v. Lombard, 149 Idaho 819, 
824, 242 P.2d 189, 194 (Ct. App. 2010).  In Lombard, the district court used an 
alternative method to determine a restitution amount, and the Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed, holding, “A determination of an appropriate restitution amount 
is left to the sound discretion of the district court.  We defer to the weight given 
by the district court to such evidence.”  Id.   
Here, Ms. Buck testified regarding the purchase price of the stolen 
jewelry.  The district court recognized the dispute and utilized its discretion:  
The Court is aware that there was a dispute regarding the values 
assigned to the items and to the items themselves.  However, there 
is no dispute that the Defendant entered a guilty plea to the charge 
of grand theft.  There is no dispute that a number of the above 
referenced items were found in local pawn shops having been 
brought in by the defendant.   
 
(R., p. 97.)  
 
The district court considered Ms. Buck’s testimony and used its discretion 
to reduce the value of some of the items.  (R., pp. 96-97.)  The district court also 
noted that, even though the parties agreed these precious metals have likely 
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appreciated in value in the years since their purchase, there was no evidence 
presented regarding the increase in value and, therefore, the district court could 
not increase the value based on the appreciation.  (Id.)  After it analyzed the 
evidence and the law regarding the definition of “value” the district court 
determined that $7,747.80 was a “fair representation of the market value to the 
victim of the property stolen by defendant.”  (R., p. 98.)  
Defendant in this case did not and likely cannot show how she was 
prejudiced by an award based on the much lower, decades old 
purchase price of the fine jewelry.  Based on the credibility of the 
victim and the foregoing considerations, the Court determines that 
the values listed above are a fair representation of the market value 
to the victim of the property stolen by the Defendant.  
 
(R., p. 98.)  The district court did not abuse its discretion by basing the market 
value of the property on the credibility of the owner and testimony regarding the 
value of the property at the time it was purchased.    
 
CONCLUSION 
  
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the restitution order 
entered by the District Court.   
 DATED this 15th day of August, 2016. 
 
       
 /s/ Ted S. Tollefson________________ 
 TED S. TOLLEFSON 
 Deputy Attorney General 
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